Croydon Resilience Team

This report provides a summary of the events from the Croydon tram incident in November 2016, and collates the lessons identified and recommendations from all Croydon Council-led debrief sessions.

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Glossary

CAC - Community Assistance Centre

CRF - Croydon Resilience Forum

DRO - Duty Resilience Officer

FCP - Forward Command Post

FFRC - Friends & Family Reception Centre

GLA - Greater London Authority

JESIP – Joint Emergency Services

Interoperability Programme

LALO - Local Authority Liaison Officer

LESLP – London Emergency Services

Liaison Panel Major Incident Procedure

LFB - London Fire Brigade

LLACC - London Local Authority

Coordination Centre

MPS - Metropolitan Police Service

RCG – Recovery Coordination Group

SCG - Strategic Coordination Group

SRC - Survivor Reception Centre

ZD - Croydon Police

Croydon Resilience Forum

The Croydon Resilience Forum (CRF) is the statutory borough resilience forum (BRF) for Croydon. A BRF primarily facilitate multi-agency emergency plan development (response arrangements), co-operation and information sharing amongst local emergency response partners.

The forum comprises of a number of agencies who could naturally be part of an emergency response. This includes emergency services, the local authority, NHS, Public Health England, British Red Cross, Samaritans, and local partners such as the business improvement district.

Incident Summary

Croydon tram incident

Date: Wednesday 9th November 2016

Location: near Sandilands Tram Stop, Addiscombe

Time of incident: 0607hr

Lead agency (response): British Transport Police

Lead agency (recovery): Croydon Council

* * * *

On the morning of Wednesday 9th November 2016, the 0553hr tram from New Addington to Wimbledon overturned upon exiting the tunnel shortly before Sandilands tram stop.

The tram was carrying 69 passengers at the time of the incident. Tragically, 7 people were killed, 19 were seriously injured and 43 had minor physical injuries (including the driver). Only one person was physically unhurt. A substantial number of people involved with the accident suffered shock and/or emotional trauma.

Those who lost their lives were:

Dane Chinnery Donald Collett Robert Huxley

Philip Logan Dorota Rynkiewicz Philip Seary Mark Smith

Most of those travelling on the tram at the time of the incident were Croydon residents. This added a unique aspect to the incident response, as the majority of the response and recovery has been focused within the borough of Croydon.

This catastrophic accident was the worst to occur on a British tramway for more than 90 years.

Emergency services were on the scene within minutes and started the rescue operation and triaging of survivors. Croydon Council CCTV heard activity over their police radio and alerted Croydon Council's Duty Resilience Officer (DRO) to an emerging situation. However they quickly lost situational awareness as the police changed their radio channels. The Metropolitan Police later contacted the council to request a survivor reception centre. By this stage, the Council's emergency response had been activated with a Local Authority Liaison Officer (LALO) en-route and the Chief Executive requesting a LBC Gold meeting at Bernard Weatherill House at 0800hr.

Throughout day one and over the coming days, Croydon Council played an integral role in the provision of humanitarian assistance to those affected (Family & Friends Reception Centre; Community Assistance Centre) as well as contributing significantly to multiagency strategic and tactical decision making as part of the incident response. Croydon Council also provided the Croydon Public Mortuary as the designated disaster mortuary, where police victim identification took place.

Croydon Council worked closely with partners to deliver the best response possible to those affected, the communities of New Addington and wider Croydon.

From day two, Croydon Council convened the multi-agency Recovery Coordinating Group (RCG), preparing for formal handover from the BTP which took place on day 4 (Saturday 12th November). The RCG continued the humanitarian effort, ensuring joint situational awareness and linkages between agencies remained strong. Activities included letters with support services information to bereaved families and survivors, regular public updates via the council website and media, provision of the Community Assistance Centre, a civic book of condolence, floral tribute ceremony, maintenance of floral tribute sites, oversight of the Croydon Tram Fund (through Just Giving), community engagement and assistance to the survivor support group.

Activity continued throughout 2017 in support of those affected, but also in preparation for the first anniversary. Croydon Council (Creative Director) led the development of the two permanent memorials, one at Sandilands commemorating the incident, and in particular those who died; with a second memorial in Market Square, New Addington, commemorating all those affected by the tragedy.

The resilience team led on the arrangements for the various ceremonies to take place on the first anniversary. This involved a private ceremony at Sandilands and a civic ceremony in New Addington.

Throughout the incident, over 180 council staff, plus key contract partners, were involved in some way in the response or recovery, many of whom also contributed to the organisation and delivery of the first anniversary commemorations.

This report brings together all of the recommendations from debriefs that were undertaken by Croydon Council. Following such a large and significant incident, it is important that time is taken to reflect upon the areas and activities that worked well, as well as those that could be improved. There are a total of 109 recommendations within this report. The recommendations are statements which re-affirm existing good practice, identifies new good practice and recognises areas of learning.

As at October 2018, many of the recommendations have been implemented, with the remaining recommendations in progress through the standard resilience team work programme.

Timeline of significant events

The following pages provide a chronological summary of the key events that took place throughout the response and recovery phase of the Croydon tram incident. This chronology includes from 0607hrs on the 9th of November 2016 to November 2018.

Wednesday 9th November 2016

~0607hr: Tram travelling from New Addington to Wimbledon derails shortly before Sandilands tram stop

0612hr: Major incident declared by British Transport Police (BTP)

0619hr: LBC CCTV notify Duty Resilience Officer (DRO)

0625hr: LBC Chief Officer (Chief Executive) notified by DRO

0647hr: Major incident declared by Metropolitan Police (MPS)

~ 0650hr: Local Authority Liaison Officer (LALO) notified & deployed to the scene

LBC Communications Team notified by DRO

MPS request welfare centre for survivors

Duty Rest Centre Manager (RCM) notified and deployed to open a Survivor Reception Centre (SRC)

0721hr: London Resilience Group (LLACC Manager) in contact with LBC Resilience Manager

0730hr: SRC opened at St Mildred's Church, Bingham Rd, Croydon CR0 7EB

0800hr: 1st London Gold Communications Group teleconference (LBC not included)

0800hr: 1st LBC Gold meeting

0815hr: Strategic Coordinating Group (SCG) tripartite teleconference (emergency

services only, LBC not included)

0830hr: Town Hall flag at half-mast

0830hr: Book of condolences opened at Town Hall

0900hr: 2nd London Gold Communications Group teleconference (LBC not included)

1000hr: 1st full SCG teleconference. Chaired by BTP

1030hr: 3rd London Gold Communications Group teleconference (LBC included)

~1030hr: SRC at St Mildred's closed

1100hr: Press conference held on-scene, led by BTP

~1100hr: Family & Friends Reception Centre (FFRC) opened in Braithwaite Hall

(closed at 2130hr)

1200hr: 2nd SCG teleconference. Chaired by BTP

~1200hr: Casualty Bureau opened

Mayor of London, MP for Croydon Central, Leader & deputies of Croydon Council visit

scene

Community Assistance Centre opened in New Addington

Information sharing conversations between LBC & BTP Gold commanders

2130hr: LBC Day 1 stand down

Thursday 10th November

1000hr: 1st Recovery Coordinating Group (RCG) teleconference

1400hr: Casualty Bureau closed - over 200 calls received

TfL Sarah Hope Line advertised as ongoing central contact point

Friday 11th November

Just Giving page established by Croydon Council

Daily RCG teleconferences continue

Saturday 12th November

~0430hr: Trams removed from site for investigation

All deceased identified and released by the Coroner to their families

0930hr: BTP and LBC Gold Commanders discuss criteria for handover

1400hr: BTP handover incident to LBC, officially starting the Recovery Phase

Sunday 13th November

Public service held at Croydon Minster

Further key events

Wed 16th Nov: RAIB release first interim report

w/c Mon 28th Nov: London Community Fund (LCF) start to distribute donations to bereaved families

Thu 1st Dec: LBC receive first list of tram passengers from BTP

Fri 2nd Dec: Final funeral held

Fri 2nd Dec: Community Assistance Centre closes; support available via Family Centre

Mon 5th Dec: Special Council meeting held

Wed 14th Dec: Floral tribute ceremony held at Sandilands

Thu 15th Dec: JustGiving page closed. Final balance £32, 383, with further donations (including corporate) provided directly to LCF

Fri 13th Jan 2017: RCG formally stood down

Tue 17th **Jan:** LCF contacts bereaved families & survivors with fund application information

Sun 25th Feb: 1st meeting of the survivor support group

February / March: Multi-agency and Croydon Council debriefs

July: Planning commences for permanent memorials and first anniversary commemorations

Thu 27th Jul: Tram incident featured on 'Inside London Fire Brigade' on ITV

September: Bereaved families sent first imagery of permanent memorial plans

October: Permanent memorial construction begins (Sandilands & Market Square)

October: Weekly logistics meetings for the first anniversary ceremonies begin

Wed 8th Nov: Permanent memorials complete

Thu 9th Nov: First anniversary commemorations.

- Bereaved families service at Sandilands
- Civic Ceremony in Market Square, New Addington
- 2 permanent memorials unveiled

7th Dec: RAIB publish final incident report

9th Nov 2018: Second anniversary commemorations

Recommendations

The following pages contain the full list of recommendations extracted from each of the debrief sessions undertaken by the various council response and recovery teams. Debriefs and resulting recommendations (or 'lessons') are commonplace in responding agencies following a major incident as it is important to review the response and recovery activities undertaken.

There are 109 recommendations within this document. The debrief sessions referred to in this document were hosted by Croydon Council.

The recommendations are statements which re-affirm existing good practice, identifies new good practice and recognises areas of learning.

These recommendations will be primarily owned by the resilience team who will work to make adjustments to the arrangements of Croydon Council and Croydon Resilience Forum agencies emergency response arrangements. Since November 2016, a number of these recommendations have been implemented or are in progress.

Note: The multi-agency response phase strategic and tactical debrief lessons are not included in this document as they were hosted and compiled by the police.

		Debrief
#	Recommendation	Debrief origin
1	Improve familiarity between Chief Officers and the Resilience Team	Origin
•		
2	Develop a clear 'Gold' team activation membership for the Resilience Team to use, including re-designating a Gold command room in BWH.	
3	Executive Directors should automatically be invited to initial Council Gold meetings.	
4	Consider pre-meets / LBC-only meeting schedule shortly before Strategic Coordinating Group's (SCG) to minimise disruption to response delivery priorities.	
5	Resilience Team to provide a LBC 'common operating picture' (COP) to key officer group (& Members where appropriate) throughout the incident period. Frequency should be determined in line with the incident type and pace of information change.	
6	Resilience Team to establish a key contact list related to the incident. This should include a 'one line' descriptor of the person's role within the incident (i.e. Council Gold; MPS Bronze Recovery; BTP Family Liaison Officer group lead).	LBC Strategic (Gold)
7	Internal communications to staff should be published at the earliest opportunity to outline the current situation and the Council's operational response. Messaging should include pertinent information to assist staff – such as information lines and travel information.	
8	Communications messages (email and intranet) should include a message to managers to ensure that their staff without access to ICT are informed.	
9	Early and sustained interaction with media outlets during an incident is important to ensure wider continued situational awareness and positive relationships.	
10	Where suitable, use targeted resident contact groups (including social media) to send specific messages to particular communities.	

#	Recommendation	Debrief origin
11	Careful consideration should be given to the deployment/ visitation of staff and partners to the scene of an incident, ensuring preparedness and appropriateness of activities to be carried out while on-scene.	
12	Ensure all Members are kept abreast at regular intervals during the response and recovery phase; including specific messaging for key politicians such as the Leader, Deputy Leader, Lead Cabinet Member, affected ward members, Mayor, Deputy Mayor, MPs, Mayor of London/GLA (if appropriate).	
13	Multi-agency partners should undertake regular major incident training and exercising to improve awareness of roles, responsibilities and terminology used during major incidents, such as those detailed in JESIP and LESLP.	
14	Continued membership to the Croydon Resilience Forum of Category One & Two responders under the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 should be encouraged.	
15	Voluntary sector partners provide a valuable contribution to the response and recovery of a major incident. Voluntary organisations should continue to be included in multi-agency emergency preparedness activities.	
16	The Croydon Resilience Forum to review local data sharing principles and protocols for major incident to support effective response and recovery.	
17	A central distribution list for communications leads should be established at the start of major incidents to enable all multi-agency partners to receive direct updates to support their own communications activities, rather than requiring to access statements on agency social media.	
18	Multi-agency concerns to support London and national learning to be conveyed at the multi-agency tactical and strategic response debriefs (01 and 03 February 2017).	LBC Strategic (Gold)
19	A council presence in the affected community following an incident should be implemented at the earliest opportunity to support public information sharing and provide reassurance.	
20	A Community Impact Assessment should be undertaken in every major incident to consider the appropriate location of assistance centres (Survivor Reception Centre; Rest Centre; Family & Friends Reception Centre; Community / Humanitarian Assistance Centre) based upon the incident location and community affected. This could mean that more than one of a type of centre is required.	
21	Resilience Team to review the LBC Corporate Recovery Plan and include key lessons identified from the tram incident, ensuring a clear sub-group structure (e.g. humanitarian assistance; health & wellbeing) is incorporated with associated roles and responsibilities.	
22	The LBC Corporate Recovery Plan to include clear activation and detailed expected outcomes of standard workstreams/ sub-groups as well as planning assumptions regarding administration of said workstreams/ sub-groups. For example, agenda templates, Chairperson aide-memoire.	
23	Resilience, Public Health and Human Resources will review current support available for staff and to develop a guide for the organisation to support those involved in a major incident response to ensure appropriate support is available.	
24	Resilience Team to seek assistance from key support services (i.e. Democratic Services) to support administrative tasks such as minute taking during response and recovery phases.	

#	Recommendation	Debrief origin
25	A SharePoint collaboration site should be established by the Resilience Team foreach incident to ensure a centralised point for information.	LBC Strategic (Gold)
26	A LBC Common Operating Picture (COP) should be produced and distributed to key internal stakeholders by the Resilience Team, summarising key activity & information to ensure consistent situational awareness.	
27	Croydon Council should hold an annual corporate training exercise, including senior strategic managers, to ensure there is a clear understanding and confidence in the council's procedures and expectations in the response to an incident. It is recommended that alternate years focus on a community 'emergency' then an internal 'business continuity' disruption.	
28	Request that the Croydon (ZD) police channel remains used during an incident to maintain situational awareness across partners.	
29	Check the contact details and standard operating procedure that LFB control follow to request a Croydon LALO.	
30	Ensure all LALO's hi-visibility clothing has 'LALO' clearly written on it.	
31	All emergency response volunteers should have a specific ID card which states their name, role, council logo, and their photo.	
32	LALOs to request the sharing of silver meeting minutes and attendance at each meeting.	LBC Tactical (Silver)
33	Practise LALO handover briefings to ensure all feel comfortable in stepping into, and out of, the response role during an incident.	
34	Ensure that those who are on site (incident, or elsewhere) are provided with regular updates, even if there is no new information to provide so they feel well informed.	
35	Ensure VIP visits are communicated to council staff at the location as soon as possible so they can be prepared.	
36	All council officers should report health and safety breaches or 'near misses' to the health and safety team as soon as possible for investigation.	
37	Provide key frontline responders (including contract partners) with major incident training to provide them with an awareness of the council's and other responders' key roles and responsibilities.	
38	Explore building in to future contracts (such as highways, leisure centres) the potential need to assist in the response to an emergency.	
39	Ensure all responders have a shared situational awareness, regularly circulate a situation report detailing the common operating picture and horizon scan.	
40	Centre managers should hold regular updates with staff and attendees by way of a meeting (staff) every 2 hours and attendees (hourly) during shifts, even if there is nothing significant to update.	Community
41	Be mindful of materials (such as leaflets) displayed within centres and consider the most appropriate place for their display and subsequent collection by attendees.	Assistance Centre Managers

#	Recommendation	Debrief origin
42	Where possible, WiFi should be made available in centres to support managers and staff in conducting their work and keeping situational awareness.	
43	Fully consider options for centre locations and ensure that their environments are fit for purpose to accommodate distressed persons and staff for significant periods of time.	
44	Where possible, staff attending centres should not have worked in the 8hrs previous to attending the centre.	
45	LBC volunteers should undergo psychological first aid training to support attendees at centres and each other.	
46	LBC plans to be updated / developed, with subsequent training, to reflect the differences in the delivery of a Survivor Reception Centre (SRC) / Family & Friends Reception Centre (FFRC) / Community Assistance Centre (CAC) (as opposed to a rest centre).	
47	Consider on-line training package for centre staff to support training needs and currency of skill.	
48	LBC should source staff who can support staff finishing a shift, by speaking to them and offering a 'listening ear' and personal debrief; and consider a 24hr break before returning for a shift.	
49	When choosing a CAC location, careful consideration should be paid to the surrounding area, including access and what is in view from centre widows.	Community Assistance
50	Where a centre closes for the evening, a handover form (in the least) should be completed for the following day's manager. Where possible, a telephone discussion should take place to ensure transfer and consistency of information.	Centre Managers
51	Resilience Team to explore opportunities to have electronic document store and situational awareness tool that could help staff with briefings and handovers.	
52	Resilience Team to ensure that enough signage is available within the Rest Centre suitcase and managers to request extra signage if required.	
53	Resilience Team to ensure that centre managers are fully briefed as soon as possible ahead of any VIP visits to a centre.	
54	Strategic Coordination Group should ensure that the breadth of community groups in an affected area are able to participate effectively in the recovery process. Where it is not appropriate for the group to be deployed to the CAC, other activities or initiatives should be encouraged to support the wider community due to their strong local connections.	
55	In large, prolonged incidents, voluntary agencies should consider a joint deployment strategy to ensure effective use of personnel and reduce duplication of efforts.	
56	Consideration should be given to the agencies involved in providing official support from within centres, ensuring only recognised third sector organisations are in operation. This should be discussed and agreed with local Councillors.	

#	Recommendation	Debrief origin
57	Centre managers to have an exercise that focusses on the role of a centre manager and include the practical aspects of fulfilling that role.	-
58	Resilience Team to increase frequency of organisational resilience awareness sessions and explore its role in the corporate induction process.	
59	Resilience Team to develop training for volunteers on personal resilience and bereavement management/awareness.	Community Assistance
60	Resilience Team to increase awareness with managers of volunteers so they are aware of what their staff do.	Centre Managers
61	Resilience Team to develop opportunities for volunteers to improve awareness and skills regarding other wider response team functions (e.g. LALO, BECC, Rest Centres)	
62	Review the activation procedure for the Designated Disaster Mortuary (DDM) to ensure all key officers and services are informed by appropriate lead officers in a timely manner.	
63	Review the appropriateness of the public mortuary for the purpose of a DDM	-
64	Consider the inclusion of the Coroner at Strategic Coordination Group ('Gold') meetings at the start of the incident to improve situational awareness.	
65	Consider a review of communication channels and procedures between the Coroner's office and the mortuary to ensure Coroner directives are communicated.	Death Management
66	Review the DDM plan with consideration for administrative functions, ensuring that suitable facilities (administration and welfare) are available for use during a mass fatality incident.	
67	Survey the Croydon Public Mortuary (CPM) site for a suitable location to host a CT scanner (which has large dimensions) and ensure that the determined location is recorded in the Croydon DDM Plan. This would allow for on-site scanning in future large incidents where this could be required.	
68	Ensure that all critical information such as casualty and fatality figures are coordinated and confirmed via the Strategic Coordination Group ('Gold'), providing consistency of information for response partners and the media.	
69	Review the Council's contract with Veolia to include a "special circumstances" clause.	
70	When deciding which venue will host a reception / assistance centre, if practicable, use ward Councillor's local knowledge to assist the decision making to avoid any political or community conflict.	
71	Within member updates, include a practical guide which includes information such as signposting to the council website for updates, Casualty Bureau details etc. so that they can assist in spreading key messages within the community.	Members
72	Develop a protocol for agencies who are supporting reception / assistance centres which states that individuals need relevant qualifications or experience to be able to assist in the centre.	
73	Following an incident where people have/are expected to have lost lives, consider a memorial event in the following days to address collective grief.	

#	Recommendation	Debrief origin
74	Deliver training/exercise sessions focused on Councillor's roles and responsibilities to enable them to better support the community of Croydon and aid the council's response to an emergency.	Members
75	Resilience Team and CCTV to review current procedure for the notification of the Duty Resilience Officer, considering trigger points and expected actions.	
76	Resilience Team to review Corporate Emergency Management Team (CEMT) framework, with a focus on trigger points and activities for activation.	
77	Resilience Team to review DRO on-call resources and action lists. Consider order of notification of key staff i.e. Chief Officer on Call (COoC), Resilience Manager, CEMT, volunteers, etc.	
78	Remove Chief Executive from COoC rota due to general involvement in incidents and on-going London Local Authority Gold rota.	
79	Include notification of London Resilience Group (Duty Officer) to Duty Resilience Officer action list.	
80	Resilience Team to workshop current Everbridge capability and develop a testing process for activation of CEMT and response volunteers.	
81	Where possible, and in alignment with Borough Emergency Control Centre operations, Resilience Team (or a member of) should co-locate with the CEMT (or be consistently present in BWH) during the majority of the incident to support situational awareness and effective coordination.	Resilience Team
82	Room 1.01/1.02 should be designated for use during a major incident within the Corporate Emergency Response Plan.	
83	Resilience Team to develop a template within the collaboration site for volunteers that can be used as a daily COP for volunteers with key information pertinent to them included.	
84	Resilience Team to develop a tracker to be used at the beginning of the Recovery phase, pre-populated with standing activities and considerations.	
85	Resilience Team to include a simple aide-memoire for working/ sub groups within the LBC Recovery Management Plan, including storage of information to monitor progress.	
86	Resilience Team to review Croydon Resilience Forum membership list and consider absent agencies.	
87	Local authorities should establish a Recovery Coordination Group (RCG) at the earliest opportunity to plan recovery activities, linking with the response phase for a smooth transition to formal recovery.	
88	When requested to be part of a Recovery Coordination Group, (RCG) agencies should ensure that they participate (in the first instance) and provide appropriate representation.	Multi Agonov
89	Agencies should continue to attend the Croydon Resilience Forum (CRF) for response and network capability enhancement. Agencies should seek to invite staff that have responsibilities during a response to relevant CRF exercises.	Multi Agency Recovery

#	Recommendation	Debrief origin
90	Strategic commanders from key agencies for response and recovery phases should establish direct communication early and have regular contact to assist in the transition and implementation of recovery.	
91	A Croydon Resilience Forum Common Operating Picture (COP) template to be developed (including key incident information), and during a major incident, the CRF chair (Croydon Council) should share timely updates to its members, supporting full situational awareness.	
92	A protocol for political figures should be developed to provide guidance as to expectations during an incident response and key responsibilities.	
93	A central 'action plan' should be used as part of central recovery coordination to track progress and horizon scan upcoming tasks and activities.	
94	Croydon Council and London Resilience Group, and agencies where relevant, to be part of the London Recovery Framework Review, in particular considering user-friendliness of the framework and using experience to enhance current practice.	
95	Croydon Resilience Forum to consider development of local 'strategic' coordination protocols for when pan-London arrangements are activated, but local, borough leadership decisions are required.	
96	Croydon Council to review LBC Recovery Management Plan, ensuring work- group structures, protocols and documentation templates are included and available for use.	Multi Agency Recovery
97	The sharing of incident and people affected information should be done at the earliest opportunity to allow responding agencies to plan for possible activity to support the overall incident response and recovery.	
98	Agencies to ensure there is consistency in agency aims (strategy) and on-scene operations, to ensure on-going engagement between agencies at all levels is consistent and clear.	
99	Senior managers within responding agencies are to be familiar with major incident information sharing protocols and share adequate information with key response partners as soon as possible.	
100	Croydon Resilience Forum to develop an information sharing protocol template to be used in major incidents.	
101	Strengthening of strategic relationships between BTP commanders and local authority Chief Executives should be explored via London Resilience and existing working groups (e.g. Chief Executives London Committee).	
102	Ensure the local train operators and TfL are standing members of the Croydon Resilience Forum to ensure appropriate and effective liaison between agencies.	
103	NHS England (London) to understand the arrangements made in each receiving hospital, and work with partner agencies to develop guidance / good practice guide for hospitals in similar situations (i.e. as Family & Friends Reception Centre).	

#	Recommendation	Debrief origin
104	A briefing note for agencies outlining the role of the Sarah Hope Line in a TfL network incident should be developed and shared amongst Borough Resilience Forums to be included in local resilience plans.	
105	Early conversations should be had between TfL Sarah Hope Line (when activated) and responding agencies to clarify and establish channels for available assistance, to support the triaging of Line callers.	
106	Changes to the location of assistance centres should be formally discussed and agreed amongst all agencies before implementing to ensure consistency, or improvement, of services is maintained in alternative locations.	
107	Croydon Council to coordinate the development of 'Major incident floral tribute guidance for local authorities' for distribution amongst London local authority emergency planning teams, including practical considerations, best practice and key learning from previous significant incidents from other councils.	Multi Agency Recovery
108	Multi-agency training and exercising through the Croydon Resilience Forum should continue at regular intervals throughout the year to support joint-learning and organisational familiarity.	
109	Agencies should review relevant response plans in light of the Croydon tram incident, their agency's experience during the incident, and recommendations made within official debrief documents.	
	Note: Specific recommendations have not been made regarding the first year anniversary commemorations. However, a summary of the approach, activities, and considered good practice, is held by the resilience team.	First Anniversary / Commemorat ions

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